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DECISION MAKING AUTONOMY OF 
JOINT VENTURES : 
An Empirical Study of Joint Ventures between 
Foreign MNCs and Turkish Industrial Groups 
Mehmet D E M ? R B A A '" 
Introduction 
Increased international joint venture (IN) activity was seen as one of the major changes 
in  international business environment in  the past decade,  and  is  popular means of entry 
for  multinational  companies  (MNCs).  This  type  of co­operative  operations  has  alsa 
became an essential part of business strategies of MNCs and  their partners,  partieuIarly 
local  industrial groups of developing countries.  Some of the co­operative ventures have 
invoIved  blue­chip  companies  at  national  and  international  levels,  promoting  high 
technology discovery within research and development consortia; others have  involved 
making  break­through  and  cost  saving  and  design  in  construction  companies;  while 
some joint ventures have invoIved organisations with mature technologies, and between 
those who have marketing channels, resources, business expertise and financial  muscle, 
and  the  innovators. ? ı To achieve  their corporate objectives, MNCs  need  to  identify  and 
create opportunities presented by potentially attractive and  under expIored  international 
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markets.2 However,  there are more motives for  foreign  direct investment  than  there are 
separate  investment decisions.3 The major advantages  identified  for  such  operations  in 
the  international  business  literature  are;  (1) to  improve  a  firm's  strategic position  in  a 
eompetitive  market  plaee4  sinee  a  loeal  partner  can  provide  it with  an  established 
network  with  the  environment  and  management  of  environmental  relations;  (2)  to 
"block  eompetition"  by  turning  potential  eompetitors  into  allies,5  (3)  to  provide 
horizontal  or  vertical  integration  opportunities  for  parents,6  (4)  to  aequire  or  share  a 
firm's  knowledge  or  business  eulture,7  (5)  to  overeome  host  government  regulations,8 
(6)  to  reduee  transaction  eosts,9  and  (7)  to  reduee  the  finaneial  and  politieal  risk. IO • 
Despite  the  inereasing  popularity  of joint  ventures,  experienees  and  observations  of 
businessmen  and  managers  alike  suggest  that  this  type  of  organisations  are  not 
eomplieation free.  These eomplieations may  eause some distinet disadvantages,  if they 
are overlooked or  i g n o r e d d ? ? ı
1 D.K.  Datta,  "International Joint Ventures:  A Framework for  Analysis",  Journal of General Management. 
? ı4 (2),  1988, p.78­9 ? . .
3  P.J.  Buckley  and  M.  Casson,  The  Economic  Theory  of  the  Multinational  Enterprise,  London: 
MacMilllan,  1985. 
4 B. Kogut,  "Joint Ventures  : T h ~ o r e t i c a l l and Empirical Perspectives", Strategic Management Journal, 9 (4), 
1988, p.3 19­332. 
5  L. Berstein,  "Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Development: Anticompetitive Joint Venture", 
Antitrust Bulletin,  i O,  1965;  F.  Contractor and  P.  Lorange,  "Why Should Firms Cooperate:  The  Strategy 
and  E c o n o m ? c c Basis  for  Co­operative  Ventures",  in  F.  Contractor  and  P.  Lorange  (eds.),  Cooperative 
Strategies  in  International Business,  3­29,  Lexigton  Mass:  Lexington  Books,  1988;  J.F.  Hennart,  "A 
Transaction  Cost Theory of Equity Joint Ventures",  Strategic Management Journal, 9  (4),  1988,  p.361-
374. 
6  K.R.  Harrigan, Strategies for Joint Ventures, Lexington Mass:  Lexington Books,  1985;  J.L.  Williamson, 
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York, Free Press,  1975. 
7  S.V.  Berg,  et al,  Joint Venture Strategies and Corporate Innovation, Cambridge:  O e l g e ~ c h l a g e r , , Gunn 
and  Hain,  1982;  E.  Roberts,  "New  Ventures  for  Corporate  Growth",  Harvard  Business  Review,  July-
August,  1980;  M.  Lyles,  "Leaming  Among  Joint  Venture­Sphisticated  Firms",  in  F.  Contractor,  and  P. 
Lorange (eds.), Cooperative Strategies in International Business, Lexigton Mas, Lexington Books,  1988; 
Demirbag, Mirza and Weir, op.cit.,  1995, p.60. 
8  L.  Franko,  Joint  Venture  Survival  in  Multinational  Corporations,  New  York:  Praeger,  1971;  K.R. 
Harrigan,  "Joint Ventures and Competitive Strategy", Strategic Management Journal, 9  (2),  1988a, p.141 
­ 158.;  UNCTC,  "Arrangement between  Joint  venture  Partners  in  Developing Countries",  United  Nations 
Centre  on  Transnational  Corporations,  UNCTC Advisory  Studies Series B,  NO.2,  New  York,  1987;  M. 
Demirbag, The Dynamics of Foreign.Local Joint Venture Formation and Performance in Turkey, PhD 
Thesis, University of Bradford,  1994. 
9  Buckley and Casson, op.cit.,  1985; P.  Beamish and J.  Banks,  "Equity Joint Ventures and the  Internalisation 
Approach  to  the  Theory  of the  MNE",  Working Paper, Wilfrid  Laurler University,  Ontario,  Canada, 
1985; Hennart, op.cit., p.365. 
10  Demirbag, Mirza, Weir,  op.cit.,  1995; M.  Demirbag and R.  G ü n e ? , , " P o l i t ? c a l l Risk Assessment  of Central 
Asian Republics and Russia:  A Case Study of Turkish Companies Operating in Central Asian and  R u s s ? a n n
12thMarkets",  Paper  Presented  at  the  Annual  Conference  of  Euro·Asia  Management  Studies 
Association, November 8­1 i, 1995,  SDA  Bocconi,  Milan,  1997;  M.  Demirbag, R. G ü n e ? ş and  H.  Mirza, 
"Managemnet of Political Risk:  A Case Study of Turkish Companieas  in Central Asia and Russia",  in  H. 
Mirza (ed.), Beyond Protectionism, London: Edward Elgar (forthcoming in  1997). 
11  S.E. Roulac,  "Structuring the Joint Venture", Mergers and Acquisitions, Spring,  ? ı 983; R.M.  Kanter,  "The 
New Alliances: How  Strategic Alliances are Reshaping American Business",  in  H.  Sawyer (ed), Business 
in  a  Contemporary World,  New  York:  University  Press  of America,  1988,  p.59­82;  1.  Mohr  and  R. 
Spek man , "Characteristics of Partnership Success:  Partnership Attributes,  Cornmunication Behaviour,  and 
Conflict Resolution Techniques", Strategic Management Journal,  ? 5 5 (2):  1994, p.136. 
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Many studies have pinpointed  the high rate of divorce between joint venture partners. 12 
Contributors  to  such  problems  faced  in  IV  operations  incIude  the  incompatibility  of 
partners' expectations,13 the  incongruence of goals,14 the improper division of power and 
control  between  partners, IS  and  poor  cooperation  between  partners. 16  Furthermore, 
where as  in  wholly  owned  subsidiaries  of MNCs  there  is  onlyone  parent  firm  and 
usually two major employee groups, BVs have at  least two parent firms  and a variety of 
employee groups. Each of the se parent firms  have their own unique structure, goals  and 
operation  mode.  In  the  midst  of this  complex  s ? t u a t i o n n stand s  the  BV,  which  needs 
authority  for  management of operation.  BV management  faces  simu1taneous  demand3 
from policy makers of parent firms and various employee group s in each organisation. 
This  paper  attempts  to  outline  core  characteristics  of control  exercised  and  autonomy 
given by parent companies to joint venture management in  t h e ? r r decisions.  Following a 
brief  examination  of  the  literature  related  to  control  in  international  operations,  the 
theoretical framework of the decision making will  be discussed.  In  the last section of the 
paper empirical  results of the employed  framework will  be assessed  in  connection with 
a sample of foreign­Turkish joint ventures and  their parent firms.  In so doing,  the paper 
aims  to  explore  the  kind  and  extent  of autonomy  given  to  joint venture  management. 






it  ? s s not  surprising  to  find  a  variety  of  approaches  to  conceptualising  and 
operationalizing  control,  due  to  proliferation  of studies  and  importance  of the  issue. 
12  P.  Beamish,  "The Characteristics  of Joint  Ventures  in  Developed  and  Developing Countries",  Columbia 
Journal  of  World  Business,  20  (3),  1985,  p.l3­19;  Janger.  Organization  of  International  Joint 
Ventures,  New  York:  Conference  Board.  1980;  P.  Killing,  Strategies for Joint Venture Success,  New 
York,  Praeger,  1983; B. Kogut,  "Cooperative and Competitive Influences on  Joint Venture Stability under 
Competing  Risks  of  Acquisition  and  Dissolution",  Working  Paper,  University  of  Pennsylvania, 
December,  1986;  K.R.  Harrigan,  Managing  for  Joint  Venture  Success,  Lexington  Mass:  Lexington 
Books,  1986. 
13  J.  Geringer,  Joint  Venture  Partner  Seleclion:  Strategy  for  Developed  Countries,  Westport  Conn.: 
Quorum  Books,  ] 988a;  J.  Geringer,  "Selection  of Partners  for  Intern"ational  Joint  Ventures",  Business 
Quarterly, Summer,  t988b; Killing, op.cit. 
14  E. Anderson,  "Two  Finns, One Frontier:  On  Assessing  Joint  Venture  Perfonnance",  Sloan Management 
Review,  Winter,  1990,  p.19­30;  Berg,·op.cit.;  Harrigan,  op.cit.,  1985;  Routac,  op.cit.;  P.W.  Beamish, 
Multinational Joint Ventures in Developing Countries. London: Routledge,  ? ı988. 
IS  Geringer  et  aL.,  "Control  and  Perfonnance  of  International  Joint  Ventures",  Journal  of  International 
Business  Studies,  20  (2),  1989,  p.235­253;  Ki iling,  op.cit.;  J.L.  Schaan,  "Parent  Control  and  Joint 
Venture  Success  :  The  Case  of Mexico",  Unpublished  PhD  Thesis,  University  of Western  Ontario: 
Canada,  1983;  M.  D e m i r b a ? ğ and  H.  Mirza,  "Inter­Partner  Reliance,  Exchange  of  Resources  and 
Partners'  Influence  on  Joint  Venture's  Strategy",  University  of  Bradford,  Management  Centre, 
Discussion Paper Series, (accepted for publication  in  1996). 
16 PJ. Buckley and M.C. Casson,  iLA  Theory of Cooperation in  International Business",  ? n n F.J. Contmctor and 
P.  Lorange (eds.),  Cooperative Strategies in International Business_:  Lexington MA:  Lexington Books, 
D.C. Heath,  1988, p.3 1­54. 
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While  some  researchers  have  been  interested  in  the  degree  of control,17  others  have 
focused on the mechanisms and systems used  to  achieve control,I!!. There are also some 
discrepancies in operationalizing the concept.  In some studies coordination is  implicitly 
assumed  to  be  a part of control  process,19  whereas  in  others  coordination  is  treated  as 
separate and distinct concept. 20 
In  international  management  iiterature ,  the  context  in  which  control  is  examined  also 
varies  across  studies. While some researchers deal with  the concept in  terms of overall 
multinational  o r g a n i s a t i o n , z ? ı others  focus  on  more  specific  relationships,  particular1y 
control  of parent companies over  international joint ventures.22 Despite  the diversity  in 
approaches,  the  need  to  examine  control  as  a  multidimensional  concept  is  becoming 
more apparent. According to Martinez and Ricks23 the concept involves both  the extent 
of control  of a  parent  companyover  its  affiliates  and  the  means  by  which  control  is 
exereised.  The concept  is  linked  to  human  resource management24  as  well  as  strategy 
formulation  and  implementation  power.2S  As  Martinez  and  Ricks  put  it,  the  extent  of 
control  of a  parent  company  stems  from  both  its  formal  authority  and  its  ability  to 
influence  affiliates;  the  means  used  to  achieve  control  come  from  the  type  of 
mechanisms and systems that a parent company is able to develop and implement. 
Decision Making Process 
Organisational  decision  making  process  can  be  formally  defined  as  the  process  of 
identifying  and  solving  problems.  Many  researchers  categorised  d e c ? s i o n n into  v a r ? o u s s
categories.  Simon26  categorises  organisational  decisions  into  programmed  or  non-
17  Beamish,  op.ciL,  1988;  D.  Cray,  "Control  and  Coordination  in  Multinational  Corporations",  Journal  of 
International Business Studies,  15  (2),  1984, p.89; Killing, op.cit. 
III  D.R. Baliga and A.M. Jeager,  "Multinational Corporatins: Control Systems and Delegation Jssues", Journal 
of International Business Studies,  15  (2),  1984,  p.26;  Y.  Doz and  e.K.  Prahalad,  "Patterns  of Strategic 
Control  within  Multinational  Corporations",  Journal  of International Business  Studies,  15  (2),  1984, 
p.55­72; Y.  Doz and e.K. Prahalad,  "Controlled Variety: A Challenge for Human Resource Management 
in the MNC", Human Resource Management, 25  (1),  1986, p.55­7 i; W.G. Eglehoff,  "Patterns of Control 
in  the U.S., U.K.,  and European Multinational Corporations", Journal of International Business Studies, 
15  (2),  1984,  p.73­83;  A.M.  Jeager,  "The Transfer of Organizational Culture Overseas  : An  Approach  to 
Control in  the Multinational Corporation", Journal  o r ? n t e r n a t i o n a l l Business Studies,  14 (2),  1983, p.91-
114;  V.  Pucik  and  J.H.  Katz,  "Information,  Control  and  Human  Resource Management  in  Multinational 
Firms", Human Resource Managernent, 25  (1),1986, p.121­132. 
19  Baliga  and  Jeager,  op.cit.;  e.K.  Prahalad  and  Y.  Doz,  The Multinational  Mission  :  Balaneing  Local 
Demands and Global Vision, New York  : The Free Press,  1987. 
20  Cray, op.cit.; Z.L.  Martinez and  ? e . . Jarillo,  "The Evolution  of Research on Coordination Mechanisms  in 
Multinational  Corporations",  Journal  of  International  Business  Studies,  20  (3),  1989,  p.489­514;  B. 
Masceranhas, "The Coordination of Manufacturing Interdependence in Multinational Companies", Journal 
ofInternational Business Studies, 15 (3),  1984, p.91­106. 
21  BaIiga and leager, op.cit.;Doz and Prahalad, op.cU.;  1984.  1986. 
2Z Beamish, op.ciL,  1988;  D e m i r b a ? ğ and Mirza, op.cU.,  1996; Geringer, op.eit.,  1989; Killing, op.cit.; Schaan, 
op.cit. 
23   Z.L.  Martinez  and  D.A.  Ricks,  "Multinational  Parent  Companies'  Influence  over  Human  Resource 
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Some  researchers  have  discussed  decision  making  from  a  process  perspective.  DaftZ7 
showed that decisions do not follow a careful analysis path,  or even systematic analysis 
of  a l t e r n a t ? v e s s and  implementation  of  solution.  He  further  elaborated  that,  on  the 
contrary,  decision  processes  are  characterised  by  conflicts,  coalition  building, 
influence, and trial  and error,  and seem to  be random and disorderly. The Garbage Can 
Theoryzs describes how decisions seem almost random in a highly organic organisation. 
They  also  see  the  tlow  and  mixture  of decisions,  problems,  ideas  and  people  in  the 
process of decision making. 
The study by Bradford groupZ9  investigated  150 decisions across  10 topics (i.e.  product, 
personnel,  reorganisations,  boundaries,  locations,  inputs,  technologies,  domain,  control 
and  services)  in  30  organisations,  and  found  that  different  topics  undergo  different 
decision­making  processes.  Decision  processes  are  categorised  as  sporadic,  fluid,  and 
constricted.  A  sporadic  process  shows  that  decisions  run  into  delays,  are  more  time 
consuming,  and  have more  variability  in  information. A fluid  process has  less delay,  is 
less  time  consuming,  and  has  less  variability  in  information.  A  constricted  process 
shares some delays of sporadic process,  and allows  less  scope  for  negotiation,  and  it is 
thus somewhat in between fluid and sporadic.30 
In  matching  decisions  and  structure,31  Butler  proposed  the  principle  of  requisite 
decision­making capacity which states that: 
An organisation needs design  a structure of requisite capacity;  that  is,  one sufficiently crisp  to 
minimise  decision  making  costs  and  sufficiently  fuzzy  to  achieve  adaptabi1ity.  This  is  the 
overall organisational design problem ...... more picturesquely stated  : fuziness  is needed to  cope 
with indeterminateness. 
While  it  is  relevant to  look  into compatibility of structure and design with  the  decision 
making\ process,  it  is  also  important  to  understand  who  the  individuals  are  that  make 
decisions.  Obviously, most  decisions  in  organisations  are  not made by  a  single person 
but there are some influential people who could decide on some important maUers. 
Brooke3z  reviewed  relevant  studies  about  centralisation  and  decentralisation  and  also 






29  DJ.  Hickson,  RJ.  Butler,  D.  Cmy,  R.G.  Mallory  and  D.C.  Wilson,  Top Decisions:  Strategic Decision 
Making in Organizations, Oxford: Basit Blackwell, San Francisco: Jossey­Bass, 1986. 
30 RJ. Butler, Designing Organisations: A Decision­Making Perspective, London:  Routledge,  1991, p.2 ? ı 0-
214. 
31 Ibid., p.57. 
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Writers are continually being pulled between participatory notions of centralisation and 
decentralisation, and a hierarchical analysis. Frequently, centralisation is seen in locus of 
decision-making at the top. and decentralisation is seen as increasing participation with all the 
alleged beneflts of a democratically organised company. In fact, these two are not opposites but 
different interpretations of the same concept. Decentralisation in locus of decision-making 
terms may not imply any increase in participation at alL'u 
Although this study will attempt to investigate the extent of influence exercised by 
parent companies and joint venture management on various d e c i s ? o n n topics, it also aims 
to see the underlying dimensions of decision areas in such mu1ti-parent organisations. 
Since decision making is a social process, it is also important to investigate further the 
extent of decision making autonomy that joint venture management in a developing 
country may enjoy. Therefore the researcher will investigate the concept of autonomy in 
decision making process. Comparison of both parent f ? r m s ' ' influence on certain 
strategic and operational decisions may reveal underlying dimensions of joint venture 
management's decision-making autonomy. 
Autonomy and Inter-dependency ? n n J o ? n t t Venture Operations 
Among the most s i g n i f ? c a n t t consequences that theorists have attributed to the 
establishment of inter-organisational relationship is a loss of organisational decision 
making capacity or autonomy.34 Hence, most organisations attempt to avoid inter-
organizational  relationship  so  far  as  these  relations  inhibit  organisational  freedom  in 
making their own decisions and managing their own destiny.35 
Pfeffer and Salancik argue that organisations seek to avoid being controlled in exchange 
relationship,  and  that  an  organisation  aversion  in  establishing  inter  organisational 
relationships will  be proportional  to  the loss of autonomy anticipated  to  result  from  the 
relationship formation. 
Brooke  and  associates  studied  the  issue  of  centralisation  and  autonomy  between 
companies and their subsidiaries, which is  also known as The Manchester Studies.36 The 
studies  hav.e  provided  c l a r i f ? c a t i o n n concerning  autonomy  and  centralisation.  As 
Brooke37  put it; 
32  M.Z.  Brooke,  Centralization  and  Autonomy:  A  Study  in  Organization  Behaviour,  London:  Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston,  1984. 
33 Ibid., p.146. 
34   J.  Pfeffer  and  G.R.  Salancik,  The  External  Control  of  Organizations:  A  Resource  Dependence 
Perspective, New York, Harper and Row,  1978. 
3S D. Thompson. Organizations in Action, New York, McGraw Hill,  1967; K.S. Cook,  "Exchange and Power 
in  Networks  of Inter­Organizationa!  Relations",  Sociological Quarterly,  18,  1977,  p.62­82;  Pfeffer  and 
Salancik, op.cit.; H.E.  Aldrich, Organizations and  E n v i r o n m e n t t ? ı Englewood  Cliff,  N.J:  Prentice HalL, 
1979;  C.  Oliver,  "Determinants  of Inter­Organizational  Relations:  Intergrations  and  Future  Directions " , 
Academy of Management Review,  15 (2),  1990, p.241­265. 
36 M.Z. Brooke and H.L. Remmers, The Multinational Company in Europe, London: Longman,  ? ı 972; M.Z. 
Brooke  and  H.L.  Remmers,  The Strategy  of Multinational  Enterprise,  London:  Pitman,  1978;  M.Z. 
Brooke  and  M.  Black,  "The  Autonomy  of Foreign  Subsidiary",  International Studies of Management 
and Organization, Spring­Summer,  1976, p. 11­26. 
37 Brooke, op,cit.,  1984. 
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Centralisation is not seen as synonymous with effieiency any more than autonomy with 
humanity; r..either are to be seen as the fruits of a complete random process ..... The cycle of 
centralisation and autonomy will change as the frame of reference, the context, c h a n g e s . 3 ~ ~
Definitions of Organisational Autonomy 
Brooke39 refers to autonomy as one in which units and sub-units possess the ability to 
take decisions for themselves on the issues which are reserved to a top decision makers 
in a comparable organisation. The difficulty to make a distinction between autonomy 
and decentralisation, are overcome by distinguishing between different kind and 
d i m e n s ? o n s s of autonomy. Terms like delegation, devolution, and discretion were used to 
provide a wider dimensions of autonomy. Hence, to investigate autonomy and 
centralisation is to see the comparatiye relationship between two or more u n ? t s s of an 
organisation. 
According to Oliver,40 organisational autonomy refers to an organisation's freedom to 
make its own decisions about the use and allocation of its internal resources without 
reference or regard to demands or expectations of potential linkage partners. What 
Oliver41 refers to specifically is organisational discretion to make choices in allocating 
internal resources and its freedom to invest its resources in activities that are unrelated 
to satisfying the obligations or expectations of an organisation with which it develops 
relationships. 
This definition could always see its appIication for organisation that are involved in 
such a relationship as a joint venture or joint projects. As OL ? v e e 4 2 2 repeated, 
organisational commitment of time, person'nel, also capital to joint venture or other 
forms of resource-sharing and exchange obliges the organisation to divert resources to 
activities where decision making authority and responsibility are no longer the exclusive 
domain of the organisation. 
To some organisations, autonomy can alsa be a prime motivation in the construction of 
inter organisational ties,43 while to some, the loss of autonomy in relationship formation 
may impede an organisation's capacity to respond to future unforeseen contingencies as 
they arise in the e n v ? r o n m e n n 44 Oliver's45 general propositions conceming autonomy 
state that: 
A high degree of organisational autonomy reflects extensive organisational controlover 
internal decision process es and minimal commitment of resources to satisfying an external 
demand or sustaining an external linkage, while a low degree of autonomy indicates that 
organisations are obliged to make considerable time and resources investments in satisfying or 
deferring to inter organisational expectations and demand. 
38 Ibid. 
39lbid.  
40 C. Oliver, "Network Relations and Loss ofOrganizational Autonomy", Human Relations, 1991, p.944.  
41lbid.  
42 Ibid., p.945.  
43 D. Knoke, "Organization Sponsorship and Influence Reputation of Social lnfluence Association", Social  
Forces, 61, 1983, p . ? o 6 5 · ? o 8 ? ?
44 Butler, op.cit. 
45 Oliver, op.cit. 
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In any organisation that establishes a J o ? n t t venture with another o r g a n ? s a t i o n , , the 
ultimate challenge usually falls on the joint venture managers, as Harrigan's argument46 
about the joint venture managers ("child's managers" as she called them) stated: 
if firm's joint ventures are managed by entrepreneurial exeeutives, parents may find their ehild 
is straining at its tethers. The ehild managers may wish to exploit opportunities faster than 
parent managers had intended them to move : if the joint venturesl managers are not permitted 
to exercise initiative, the ehild will be ill-suited to move quiekly and effectively when parents 
can on it for assistance. 
Managers in an organisation are generally assumed to prefer as much autonomy of 
decision-making and also controlover the organisational environmenL it is also 
assumed that autonomy of decision-making is lost when the organisation interacts with 
the environment, and later probably loses more as it becomes more dependent on its 
environmenL In joint programmes or activities we can see more interdependency, '!S 
explained by Aiken and Hage:47 
The more organisational decision-making is eonstrained through obligations. e o m ? n i t m e n t s , , or 
eontraets with other organisations. the greater the degree of interdependeney. 
Lawrence and Lorsch48 argued that reciprocity e x ? s t s s between the environment and the 
o r g a n ? s a t i o n . . The process of reciprocity c o n s ? s t s s not only of conflict and co-operation 
but also some giying up of autonomy. Harrigan49 provided an extended view of the 
exchange process by indicating that at the base of this process is more than a simple 
exchange of inputs and outputs; rather, process of co-operation and conflict accompany 
an organisational exchange in which there is a sharing of clients (customers), funds and 
employees. 
Since managers in a joint venture organisation are involved ? n n a network of 
interdependency where the processes of co-operation and conflict happen and resources 
in terms of human and capital shared. autonomy ? n n decision-making should be the most 
important issue to be addressed. it is also important to have a closer view on various 
types of dependeney. Two types of dependeney that exist between the focal organisation 
and its environment are functional-economic dependeney and political-Iegal 
dependeney. so 
Functional-economic dependence is defined in terms of the focal organisation's relative 
position in the market system of suppIiers and customers, or could be in a service 
system of clients. Political-legal dependency is defined in terms of the focal 
organisationls relationship to an owning or controlling organisation. 
46 Harrigan, op.cit., ? ı985. 
47 M. Aiken and i Hage, " O r g a n i ? a t i o n a l l Interdependence and Intraorganizational S t n ? c t u r e " , , American 
Sociological Review, 3,1968, p.912-930. 
411 P.R. Lawrence and IV. Lorsch, Organization and Environment : Managing Differentiation and 
I n t e g r a t i o o ? ı Boston MA : Harvard Business School Press, 1967. 
4\1 K.R. Harrigan, "Joint Ventures: A Mechanism for Creating Strategic Change". in A. Pettigrew (ed). 
Management ofStrategic Change. Oxford : BasH Blackwell, 1987, p.195. 
so M. Z. Farrel. Dimensions of Organizations - Environment • Structure - Process - Performance, Santa 
Monica, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing, 1978. 
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Some specific indicators of functional dependence are the relative independence of the 
decision-making process within various functions, e.g. independence in critical 
decisions on expansion, diversification, appointment of top personnel, resource 
allocation, or long-term objectives of the organisatlon.S! 
Specific indicators of political-Iegal dependency, as shown by the Aston Studies, 
include relative size of the focal organisation in relation to the parent organisation, the 
status of the focal organisation (i.e., subsidiary or branch), representation of the focal 
organisation in policy-making bodies of the parent organisation, and the number of 
specialisiations the focal organisation contracted from the parent. S2 
Dependency between two organisations that are functionally dependent posits two 
different s ? t u a t i o n s s in comparison with parent subsidiary relationship. First, the two 
organisations, although they must cooperate, are assumed to interact under a contlict of 
interest, and both attempt to maximise their goals. Secondly, though both organisations 
exercise power and gain recognition in the interaction process, the weight of the 
influence exerted is more equally distributed between the functionally interdependent 
organisations than in the parent-subsidiary relationship.s3 
In terms of the power relationship of the organisation with the environment, studies by 
Thompson,s4 Evanss and Azumis6 have enumerated some general propositions. Among 
those suggested propositions are: 
• A large number of alternatiye sources will dilute the focal organisation in its task 
environment, hence reducing its task environment on any one organisation (e.g. private 
universities enjoyed a higher degree of decision-making autonomy as compared to 
public one s due to diversity of sources of revenue as well as lower concentration of 
revenue in a single source) . 
• Eliminating alternatives for those environmental collectivities gives the focal 
organisation greater control. 
Pugh and associatesS7 found that when ownership is viewed as a link between an 
organisation and the parent organisation, combined with links between a unit and its 
suppliers and customers, it was found that the environmentally-dependent organisations 
had less autonomy and more centralised decision making than did environmentally 
independent organisations. S8 
51lbid.  
52 D.J. Hickson, D.S. Pugh and D.C. Pheysey, "Operational Technologyand Organizational Structure: An  
Empirical Reappraisal", Administrative Science Quarterly, 14 (3), 1969, p.378-97. 
53 Farrel, op.cit., 
s4 Thompson, op.cit., • 
55 W.M. Evan, "The Organization Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations", in G. Maurer John, 
(ed.) Readings in Organization Theory: Open System Approaches, New York: Random House, 1971, 
pp. 33-45. 
s6 K. Azumi, "Environmental Needs, Resources and Agents", in Koya Azumi and Jerald Hage (eds.), 
Organizational Systems, Lexington MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972. 
57 D.S. Pugh, D.J. Hiekson, c.R. Hinings and C. Turner, "Dimensions of Organization Structure", 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 13 (1), 1968, p.65-104. 
~ l b W W • 
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In the context of joint ventures, three generic types of interdependence can be identified. 
These are, as GiIl and Butler9 discussed, pooled, sequential, and reciprocal 
interdependencies. Pooled interdependence occurs when both parents expect the joint 
venture to" provide an output but they have no direct dependence on each other. 
Sequential interdependence exists when one parent's expectations are met directly by 
the joint venture but the other parent's expectations are mediated by the former. The 
reciprocal interdependence occurs, however, when there is mutual causation between 
the parents and the joint venture. 
Besides dependence as a factor that influences autonomy, there is also the question of 
elarity of purpose or establishment of a particular joint venture or strategic alliance 
which needs to be addressed. 
Lynch60 addressed the issue of elarity in strategic alliances by proposing a number of 
critical strategic questions. Among them there are those which relate to elarity of 
mission, strategic objectives of the alliance, and the time orientation (whether it has 
long or short-term focus). 
Lyons61 suggested that among the factors to be considered for choosing the alliance 
partners is elarifying defined goals and objectives. Schaan62 cautioned that there is a fair 
chance of short and long-term objectives of partners being misunderstood so that the 
combined directions of the joint venture may not be elearly visible to anyone except 
perhaps to the joint venture manager. 
Lewis63 stressed the importance of building strong goals and being specific about it in 
order to reinforce the parent's mutual commitments. Schaan and Beamish64 discussed 
the importance of elarity in objectives. It is important to have elear definitions 
objectives to avoid conflict during the later phases since managers in joint ventures have 
to face up to varieties of expectations. Objectives have to be operationalised and 
measurement procedures have to be established to allow for performance evaluation. 
Although some of those propositions refer only to the parent-subsidiary relationship, 
international alliances or even public enterprises, it has now become more important to 
see the same kind of relationship between joint ventures and parents. 
In this study it is aimed to explore parent" firms' and joint venture management's 
influence on a number of decision areas. Therefore the paper attempts to find; 
S'I J. Gill and R. Butler, "Cycles of Trust and Distrust in Joint Ventures", European Management Journal, 14 
(1), 1996, p.83-84. 
60 P.R. Lynch, The Practical Guide to Joint Ventures and Corporate Alliances, New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1989. 
61 M.P. Lyons, "Joint Ventures as Strategic Choice: A Uterature Review", Long Range Planning, 24, 
August, 1991, p.130-144. 
62 Schaan, op.cit. 
6J J.O. Lewis, Partnership for Profit: Strueturing and Managing Strategic Alliances, New York: 1he Free 
Press, 1990. 
64 J.L. Schaan and P.W. Beamish, ! ? J o i n t t Venture General Mangers in LDCs", in F.J. Contractor and P. 
Lorange (eds.), Cooperatiye Strategies in International Business, Lexington MA, Lexington Books, 
1988. 
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• extent of differences between three groups in terms of influence exercised on 
decisions conceming joint venture operations 
• extent of differences in partners' perceptions concerning each others and joint venture 
managemL-nt's influence on selected decision areas. In order to do this, both partners 
were asked to give their views on their own organisation's, the other parent 
organisation's and joint venture management's influence on certain decision areas 
included in the questionnaire. 
Hence, the issue that need to be addressed is what kind of appropriate mixture of 
measures of autonomy form and coordination are required from both organisations, 
joint venture's and their parents. The consequences such as loss of sense of the joint 
venture direction and strategic mission as well as motivations and creativity on behalf of 
joint venture managers can further be elaborated. 
Methodology 
Identilying the Sample 
This article is based on a study that took part in Europe (the UK, Germany, and other 
continental European countries) from 1990 to 1996. Using a wide variety of sources, a 
population of 144 UYs has been identified through in-depth consultations with such 
organisations as the foreign investment directorate of Turkey, German trade delegation 
in Turkey, foreign embassies, as well as a thorough examination of the Turkish State 
Planning Organisation data base, and directories such as, Dunn and Bradstreet, and 
Compass InternationaL. 
For the sample selection four main criteria were employed: size of joint venture, 
industrial sector of operation, percentage equity shares of local and foreign parent firms, 
and foreign parent firms nationality. For the purpose of this study joint ventures were 
defined as firms which have at least one local and one foreign parent company with 
participation rates of between 20% and 80% of equity shares. Joint ventures which have 
foreign parent firms with equity share of less than 20% or more than 80% inclusive 
were not included in this research. Therefore, the population sampled for this study was 
defined as joint ventures in Turkish manufacturing industry having at least one foreign 
multinational companyas a foreign parent with an equity participation within the range 
of 20 to 80%. The equity is shared and both local and foreign concem::. have at least a 
20 % share holding. The foreign companies examined are based on Western Europe, the 
USA, and Japan. Although many researchers used at least ? ıO % share holding of 
partners as equity c r ? t e r i o n n to define international joint ventures in developing 
countries,65 one might argue that such a smaIl percentage of equity ownership may not 
reflect the true picture of joint ventures and the nature of contributions and 
6S  Beamish, op.cit., 1988; B. Gomes-Casseres, "Joint Venture InstabiIity: Is It a Problem?", Columbia 
Journal of World Business, 22 (2), ? ı 987, p.97-102; B. Gomes-Casseres, "Joint Ventures in the Faee of 
Global Competition", Sloan Management Review, 30 (3 ),1989, p.17 26; J. Chowdhury, "Performanee 
of International Joint Ventures and Wholly Owned Foreign Subsidiaries", Management International 
Review, 32 (2),1992, p.IIS-133. . 
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commitments, and would increase the sample size. Artisien and Buckley66 used at least 
2 % equity-ownership criterion but they argued that equity participation below 25 % fall 
into the category of low commitment in their study of joint ventures in Yugoslavia. 
Therefore, this research utilised at least 20 % share holding criterion (which is slightly 
conservative cut-off point as compared with earlier studies) which reflects "hightl, 
tlequaltl, and "low" financiat commitments of both local and foreign parents. The 20 % 
minimum cut-off point also makes the classification of this study reasonably consistent 
with previous studies and US Commerce Department practices (which takes 11 % 
minimum cut-off point). Joint ventures are further classified into three categories 
ordered according to the level of parent firms' ownership: majority owned if a parent's 
equity in the joint venture was between 51-79 %, 50-50-owned (or co-owned) if parents' 
equity holding was 50 %, and minority-owned if parents' equity holding was between 
20-49 %. This classification is also largely consistent with several previous studies 
using the Harvard MNE data" and other data.68 The population also excludes joint 
ventures with an initial invested capital of less than 1 billion TL, based on the 
assumption that such firms would be small sized operation. Data sources indicated that 
there were 144 joint ventures between foreign multinational companies and local 
enterprises in manufacturing industry in Turkey which met these criteria. 
Table 1. Distribution of the Sample Foreign MNCs by Country of Origin 
Country Number of firms Percentage in the sample 
Germany A8 38.0 
United Kingdom 7 14.9 
Netherlands 2 4.3 
France 2 4.3 
Belgium 1 2.1 
Italy 2 2.1 
Japan 3 6.4 
Canada 1 2.1 
United States 11 23.4 
Total 47 100.0 
Source: Foreign Parent Firm lnterviews 
Approaches to parent companies of these joint ventures resulted in the 47 foreign 
parents and affiliates, and 22 of their local partners (most of which are participant of 
more than one joint venture) agreeing to participate in this research. Hence the number 
of joint venture operations covered in this research are 47. The- 47 ventures represent 
32.6% of the total population of large and medium sized joint ventures in manufacturing 
industry of Turkey, a very satisfactory rate of participation. As for the 
iili P.F.R. A r t ? s i e n n and PJ. Buckley, "Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia: Opportunities and Constraints", Journal 
of International Business Studies, Spring, 1985, p.lll- 136. 
67 W.H. Davidson, Global Strategic Management, New York: John Wiley, 1982; Gomes-Casseres, op.cil, 
1987,1989; Chowdhury, op.cit. 
68 Beamish, op.cit.,1988, p . ? ı ? . .
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representativeness of the country of origin of these MNCs, the samp1e was drawn from 
countries that are major foreign investors in Turkish economy. 
The sample is also fair1y representative in terms of foreign parent firms' equity share in 
the joint ventures' risk capitaL. The sample splits fairly evenly between three main 
categories of operations, namely minority foreign owned, majority foreign owned and 
fifty-fifty owned joint ventures. The percentage distribution of these three main 
categories of operations within the sample are, 26% fifty - fifty owned, 38% minority 
foreign owned and 36% majority foreign owned. 
All forty-seven fit our definition of IJVs. All other types of strategic alliances were 
excluded. Sampled joint ventures operate in a wide array of industries. The sample is 
v a l ? d a t e d d by c o m p a r i ~ g g the percentage distribution of the sample firms with their 
industrial classifications. 19% of the sample were drawn from electronics and 
telecommunication industry, 8% from electrical and electrical machines, 16% from 
transport vehicles and parts, 19% from chemicals and allied industries, 10% from food, 
drink and textiles - and the rest of the sample form from various other industries. Thus 
the sample is predominantly drawn from the manufacturing industries in which foreign 
firms widely participate in Turkey. 
As for size, eighteen of the ventures had less than 100 employees, twenty two had 
between 100 and 1000 employees, and only seven employed more than 1000 workers 
each. 
Table 2. Distribution of the Sample JVs by Foreign Partners' Equity Share 
Foreign partner's equity share 
(%) 
Number of firms Percentage in the 
sample 
20-29 2 4.2 
30-39 4 8.5 
40-49 12 25.5 
50 12 25.5 
51-59 9 19.1 
60-69 6 1 2 . ~ ~
70-79 2 4.3 
Total 47 100.00 
Source : F o r e ? g n n Parent F ? r m m I n t e r v ? e w s s
Management executives were interviewed directly, although a limited number of mail 
questionnaires were also se nt to MNCs headquartered in the USA and Japan. Postal 
responses were only used to validate answers given by executives at the affiliate level. 
The questionnaire used for the field work in this stuciy was designed to apply to both 
foreign and Iocal (Turkish) parent f ? r m s , , and both parent firms' responses are reported in 
this paper. 
Operationalisation of Variables 
Apart from general information such as the scale of investment, foreign equity, duration 
of JV and local partners' features, a five point Likert-type scale was used with a "1" 
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indicating no influentiaI at all, and a "5" indicating the most influence. Questionnaire 
designed to collect quantitatiye as well as qualitatiye data from participant 
organisations, namely foreign parent, Iocal parent, and their joint yentures. 
Data Analysis Techniques Employed 
Analysis were carried out by through SPSS/PC+. In order to achieye the objectiyes of 
the study, three inter-group comparisons were designed. These were; 
• comparison between foreign and local parent firms' influence 
• comparison between IV and foreign parent firms' influence, and 
• comparison between IV and local parent firms' influence on IV's operational and 
strategic decision areas. 
These analysis were carried out on the both groups of data collected from foreign and 
Iocal parent firms. Variables included into analysis are all nominal and o r d ? n a l l
measurement yariables except basic descriptiye data such as the scale of inyestment and 
equity participation of partners which are ratio yariables. After the initial examination, 
some deYiations from the normal distribution was found. Therefore it was decided to 
use nonparametric test procedures rather than parametric ones for all yariables in this 
study. Since the aim ? s s to compare three unreIated data set, Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed Ranks test for difference between groups see m to be the most appropriate 
technique for analysis reported in this paper. 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this section of the paper empirical findings obtained through analysis of dq.ta 
collected from both local and foreign parent companies are presented. By comparing 
parent firms' and joint yenture management's influence on certain strategic and 
operational decision areas, it is intended to find out the configuration of autonomy in 
such operations. 
Tables 3 and 4 present distribution of data collected from both parents and each tabIe 
giyes three columns of numbers under titles of negatiye (-) ranks, positiye (+) ranks, and 
ties. These represent the number of cases in which local partner's score is lower, higher 
and equal to foreign partner's score respectiyely. In other words, in cases under negatiye 
(-) ranks each partner tends to claim he has relatiyely more influence oyer that decision 
area (only in the sense of comparison of two scores rather th(.1ll in absolute terms). if 
diyergence occur as a result of comparison, such diyergence is referred as type 1 
diyergence of perceptions. In cases under positiye (+) ranks, howeyer, each partner 
perceiye that ? t s s counterpart has more influence (referred as type 2 diyergence o; 
perceptions). 
Table 3. Comparison of Foreign and Local Parents' Rates of Influence on JV  
Decisions (Wilcoxon Matched:Pairs Signed Ranks Test) (t)  
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(*)i II III IV V i II III IV V (-) (+) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
2 2 2 II 29 3 6 4 Lo ? 9 9 ? 2 2 3 27 0.0500 
Prieing ? 5 5 3 ? 2 2 5 ? ? ı ? 6 6 5 9 5 7 17 ? 4 4 II 0.5556 
Product 
Selection 
4 4 Lo ? ? ı ? 4 4 21 5 6 5 5 26 6 9 0.0002 
LongTerm 
Strategy 
2 i 4 ? 2 2 27 8 5 ? ? ı 7 ? ? ı 23 6 ? 3 3 0 . 0 0 ? 8 8
Q u a ? i t y y
C o n t r o ? ı
14 6 6 ? ? ı i 9 22 8 3 2 7 20 9 ? 3 3 0.1567 
Marketing ? 3 3 7 ? 3 3 5 8 Lo 7 Lo 7 8 ? 3 3 17 12 0.6435 
Purchasing ? 4 4 7 ? ? ı 7 7 ? 5 5 5 Lo 5 7 ? 9 9 16 7 0.9804 
Costing 8 4 13 Lo II 19 8 3 7 5 23 ? o o 9 0 . O ? 6 7 7
Budgeting 6 4 8 ? 2 2 ? 6 6 2 ? ı 8 3 7 3 25 6 ? ? ı 0.0004 
F i n a n e i a ? ı
Account. 
7 12 II 8 18 19 5 6 5 7 25 9 8 0.0062 
Wage and 
Personnel 
27 5 5 4 5 7 2 7 14 12 5 29 8 0.0005 
Executive 
Selection 
12 3 ? ? ı Lo Lo 5 1 12 13 Il LO 19 13 0.1357 




(t) =Foreign Partner Sample (*) =Level ofSignificance 
Table 3 gives the foreign partners' views of the control exercised by each partner, with 1 
being "Ieast influence", 3 "shared" and 5 "most influence". As shown, in deeision areas 
such as "capital expenditure", "product selection", "long-term strategy", "costing 
methods", "financial accounting" and "training", there seems to be statistically 
significant differences between foreign and local parent firms' influences (or exereised 
control). That is to say foreign partners have more influence on deeision areas such as 
"capital expenditure" (p<O.05), "product selection" (p<O.OOO) , "long-term strategy" 
(p<O.01), "costing" (p<O.05), "budgeting" (p<O.OOl), "financlal accounting procedures" 
(p<O.Ol) and "training" (p<O.05), while local parents exercise more influence on 
decisions concerning "wages and personnel policies" (p<O.0005) and some relatively 
high influence on "executive selection and compensation" (statistically non significant). 
Before one goes any further to discuss those results reported in Table 3, we need to 
know to what extent the local partners agree with the foreign partners' views. Table 4 
reports local partners' perception of their own, and their foreign partners' influence on 
the same decision areas. Although the number of cases reported in Table 3 and 4 are 
different, exact match is al most impossible, still reported results reveal the fact that 
there are are as both parents' perceptions converge or diverge. According to local parent 
firms' perceptions Iocal parent· firms e x e r c ? s e e mu ch greater influence on "pricingl! 
(p<O,1), "purchasing" (p<O,05), "wages and personnel policy" (p<O.005), and 
"executive selection" (p<O.OO5) deeisions. 
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Table 4 Comparison of Foreign and JV Local Parent's Rates of Influence on JV  
Decisions (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test) (t)  




i ii III iV V i II iii IV V ( -) (+) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
i 2 7 9 - - 3 5 Lo 2 3 13 0.5002 
Pricing 10 2 4 2 1 5 3 5 3 2 2 8 8 0.1029 
Product 
Selection 
4 2 2 5 5 6 2 5 3 i 6 2 9 0.1073 
LongTerm 
Strategy 
i - 2 3 13 i 3 5 9 4 2 12 0.4631 
Quality 
Control 
6 2 2 7 2 7 5 i 3 2 7 3 8 0.2026 
Marketing 7 2 5 5 - 5 5 2 4 2 4 4 Lo 0.7794 
Purchasing 9 4 5 i - 4 3 6 3 2 2 8 8 0.0528 
Costing 4 3 4 5 3 6 2 5 4 1 7 4 7 0.3281 
Budgeting 3 2 2 7 5 3 2 2 6 5 4 5 9 0.9057 
Financial 
Account. 
4 5 2 4 4 5 1 3 5 4 5 7 6 0.7537 
Wage and 
Personnel 
Lo 2 3 4 1 - 2 4 II 1 12 5 0.0021 
Executive 
Selection 
9 3 3 1 3 2 1 4 2 9 i II 6 0.0042 




(t) = Local Partner Sample (*) =Level ofSignificance 
As indicated ? n n Table 3 and 4, ? n n IVs, local parent firms agree with their foreign 
partners on the influence e x e r c ? s e d d by each of them over the areas of "product selection" 
(foreign dominant), "executive selectiQn", "wage and personnel policies" (local 
dominant), "marketing", and "quality control" (roughly shared). On other decision areas 
however, both sides perceptions are significantly differenL Perceptions on partners' 
influence on decision areas such as "prieing", "long term strategy", "purchasing", 
"costing lt , "budgeting", and "training" seem to portray the first type of divergence, 
namely, both sides daim they have more influence of their own. Ratings on these 
decision areas do not indicate e x ? s t e n c e e of second type of divergence, namely, one 
partner's perception of influence exereised by its eminterpart is higher than his partner's 
perception. 
The reasons for these discrepancies of perceptions might be (i) undear division of 
decision making authority over these areas. Interviews conducted throughout this study 
revealed that the type of divergence is more likely to occur because of improper division 
of decision making power and responsibility, which can lead serious consequences ? n n
effective operation of IVs. Moreover, the divergence could also signal the existence of 
disputes or potential disputes. 
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Table 5. Comparison of Foreign Parent and JV Managementts Rates of Influence 
on JV Decisions (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test) (t) 
FP Influence on Decisions IV Influence on Decisions Ranks 
:1 Sign. 
~ ~ (*) 
i II III IV V i II III IV V (-) (+) 
Capital 2 2 2 II 29 LO 7 5 II 12 28 5 II 0.0003 
Expenditure 
Pricing 15 3 12 5 II 4 i - II 29 5 29 LO 0.0002 
Product 4 4 LO II 14 7 4 12 22 12 21 9 0.5143 
Selection 
LongTenn 2 1 4 12 27 12 5 6 7 15 25 8 1i 0.0006 
Strategy 
Quality 14 6 6 II 9 - 1 7 7 30 4 30 10 0.0000 
Control 
Marketing 13 7 13 5 8 - - 2 11 32 2 36 6 0.0000 
Purchasing 14 7 11 7 7 2 3 4 13 23 7 32 5 0.0001 
Costing 8 4 13 LO II LO 3 7 9 16 14 20 LO 0.9251 
Budgeting 6 4 8 12 16 7 7 i 6 24 15 21 8 0.9249 
Financial 7 12 il 8 18 II 7 4 8 15 20 15 9 0.1590 
Account. 
Wage and 27 5 5 4 5 3 2 4 8 28 2 36 6 0.0000 
Personnel 
Executive 12 3 II LO LO 3 5 9 7 21 12 26 6 0.0324 
Selection 
Training 9 6 7 12 11 1 - 8 14 22 8 26 LO 0.0005 
Valid' 47 47 
Responses 
(t) = F o r e ? g n n Parent Sample(*) = Level o f S ? g n i f i c a n c e e
Table 5 depicts differences between foreign parent f ? r m m and IV management's influence 
on decisions concerning IV activities from foreign parent f ? r m s ' ' point of view. As 
indicated, f o r e ? g n n parent firms tend to influence more (or ? n n other words, e x e r c ? s e e
relatively more control) decisions related to "capital expenditure" (p<O.OOO), "pricing" 
(p<O.OOO), and "long term strategy of subject o p e r a t i o n s ? l l (p<O.OOO). In other decision 
areas such as "quality control" (p<O.OOOl), "purchasing" (p<O.OOO), "wages and 
personnel policy" (p<O.OOO), and "training" (p<O.OOO) however, IV management seem 
to have relatively more influence and differences between two groups' influence on 
these decisions statistically highly s i g n i f ? c a n t . . These results impIies the fact that IV 
managers possess more autonomy ? n n decision areas related to day to day business and in 
hiring and f ? r i n g g of human resources. In strategic decisions however, foreign parent 
f ? r m s ' ' headquarters seem to exercise relatively more influence and less autonomy is 
granted to joint venture managers for such decisions. 
In order to identify the extent of decision mak.ing power given to IV management, Table 
5 and 6 need to be assessed together. Results presented in Table 6, to a great extent, 
c o n f ? r m m views of foreign parent f ? r m s . . Both parent firms agree that in decisions related 
to capital expenditure foreign parent f ? r m s s are more ? n f l u e n t i a l l than IV management, 
while in decision areas related to "prieing", "quality control", "marketing", 
"purchasing", "wage and personnel policy", "executive selection", and "training" IV 
management see m to be more influential than foreign parent headquarters. Both parent 
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f ? r m s s alsa agree that ? n n product selection decisions IV management is not necessarily 
more influential than foreign parent f ? r m s . . Therefore, albeit with some d i f f ? c u l t i e s , , one 
can condude that "product selection" decisions are "roughly shared" decisions between 
parties involved. 
Table 6. Comparison of Foreign Parent and JV Management's Rates of Influence 
on JV Decisions (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test) (t) 






i II III LV V i II III IV V (-) (+) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
i - 2 7 9 - 3 5 LO 2 3 13 0.5002 
Capital 
Expenditure 
i - 2 7 9 2 2 4 4 6 ? ? ı 4 3 0.0995 
Pricing LO 2 4 2 1 - - 2 2 14 1 15 2 0.0009 
Product 
Seleetion 
4 2 2 5 5 4 i - 4 8 6 9 2 0.5895 
Long Terrn 
Strategy 
i 2 3 l3 1 2 4 2 9 9 3 6 0.2553 
Quality 
Control 
6 2 2 7 2 - - 5 l3 i 14 3 0.0013 
Marketing 7 2 5 5 - i i 3 13 2 15 i 0.0014 
Purchasing 9 4 5 i i 5 12 O 18 O 0.0002 
Costing 4 3 4 5 3 ? ı - 2 4 ? ? ı 4 12 2 0.0262 
Budgeting 3 2 2 7 5 ? ı - i 5 ? ? ı 3 9 6 0.0995 
Finaneiat 
Aeeount. 
4 5 2 4 4 i 2 i 5 9 5 12 ? ı 0.1024 
Wage and 
Personnel 
LO 2 3 4 i 4 4 9 3 14 i 0.0033 
Executive 
Seleetion 
9 3 3 1 3 1 i ? ı 7 8 3 15 O 0.0123 




(t) = Local Parent Sample(*) = Level ofSignificance 
Comparison of both Table 5 and 6 also indicates some discrepancies between foreign 
and local parent f ? r m s ' ' perceptions conceming decision-making power on "long-term 
strategy", "costing", and " f ? n a n c i a l l accounting". A1though long-term strategy 
formulation decisions are taken jointly between parent firms, foreign parent f ? r m s s see 
IV management as powerful as their local partners. 
Table 7 summarises the foreign parent firms' ratings of influences of local parent firms 
and IV management on above mentioned decision areas. Results presented in this table, 
to a great extent, c o n f ? r m m test statistics result reported in the previous tables. Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test results reported in Table 7 impIies that local parent 
firms share "capital expenditure" decision with their counterparts, while "executive 
selection" decisions are made locally with the participation of both local parent and IV 
managemenl. As for the "long-term" strategy decisions there seems to be no s i g n i f ? c a n t t
differences between influences of both local parent and IV managemenl. Thus empirical 
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results reveal the fact that, although d e c ? s i o n s s concerning "long-term strategy" are taken 
by both local and foreign parent firms, in other decision are as such as "pricing", 
"product selection", "quality control", "marketing", "purchasing", "costing", 
"budgeting", "financial accounting procedures", and "training" joint venture 
management enjoys relatively higher autonomy. 
Table 7. Comparison of Local Parent and JV Management's Rates of Influence on 
JV Decisions (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test) (t) 





i II III LV V i II III IV V (-) (+) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
3 6 4 Lo 19 Lo 7 5 11 12 20 7 15 0.0271 
Prieing 16 5 9 5 7 4 1 11 29 2 32 8 0.0000 
Product 
Selection 
21 5 6 5 5 7 1 4 12 22 3 29 Lo 0.0003 
Long Term 
Strategy 
8 5 11 7 11 12 5 6 7 15 15 15 12 0.9508 
Quality 
Control 
22 8 3 2 7 1 7 7 30 3 33 6 0.0000 
Marketing Lo 7 Lo 7 8 - - 2 II 32 3 33 6 0.0000 
Purchasing 15 5 Lo 5 7 2 3 4 13 23 7 32 3 0.0001 
Costing 19 8 3 7 5 Lo 3 7 9 16 5 23 14 0.0153 
Budgeting 21 8 3 7 3 7 7 i 6 24 4 28 Lo 0.0001 
Fi(lanciaI 
Account. 
19 i 5 6 5 7 II 7 4 8 i 15 8 20 14 0.0323 
Wage and 
PersonneI 
7 2 7 14 12 3 2 4 8 28 13 26 3 0.0568 








(f) = Foreign Partner Sample(*) = Level ofSignificance 
As for the " e x e c u t ? v e e selection" or in other words "management recruitment", decisions, 
foreign parent firms find that frequent change of top management ? n n the j o ? n t t ventures 
s e r ? o u s l y y affects the operation both on a strategic and a daily basis. This is partieularly 
true for ? n v e s t o r s s with a long term strategy and commitment. For smaIl s ? z e d d foreign 
? n v e s t o r s , , however, the predominant objective is to generate profit in a short duration. 
Therefore, they leave this decision to local partners as long as it does not affect too 
much. it ? s s not unusual in a joint venture with a small sized foreign MNE to select a 
local person as t h e ? r r representative whose main job ? s s to check the quality of p r ? ? d u c t s s
and ensure the delivery time. 
Empirical findings presented ? n n Table 8 however, based on analysis of data collected 
from local parent firms, and therefore reflects local parent firms view of autonomy 
given to IV management. Results see m to confirm findings presented ? n n Table 7. As 
comparison of rankings and t h e ? r r significance levels indieate, joint venture management 
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p a r t ? c ? p a t e e in decisions concerning "executive selection", "long-term strategy 
formulation", and "wage and personnel policy". 
Table 8. Comparison of Local Parent and JV Management's Rates of Influence on 
JV Decisions (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test) (t) 
LP Influenee on Decisions LV Influenee on Decisions Ranks ri Sign. (*) 
i II HI IV V i II III IV V (-) (+) 
Capital - - 3 5 10 2 2 4 4 6 10 4 3 0.0736 
Expenditure 
Pricing 5 3 5 3 2 - - 2 2 14 O 13 4 0.0015 
Produet 6 2 5 3 t 4 i 4 8 2 10 4 0.0712 
Seleetion 
LongTerm 1 3 5 9 1 2 4 2 9 8 6 3 0.3967 
S t r a t e ~ v v
Quality 7 5 i 3 2 - - - 5 13 1 14 2 0.0009 
Control 
Marketing 5 5 2 4 2 i i 3 13 2 l3 2 0.0018 
P u r c h a s i n ~ ~ 4 3 6 3 2 - - i 5 12 2 14 1 0.0021 
C o s t i n ~ ~ 6 2 . 5 4 1 1 - 2 4 ii O 13 4 0.0015 
E u d ~ e t i n g g 3 2 2 6 5 1 i 5 II 1 9 7 0.0108 
Finaneiat 5 1 3 5 4 1 2 1 5 9 2 9 6 0.0454 
Account. 
h=Wageand 1 2 4 11 - 4 4 9 8 6 3 0.6603 Personnel Executive 2 1 4 2 9 1 i 7 8 7 8 2 0.5321 
SeIection 
Training 4 4 5 2 3 ~ ~ 6 12 1 13 3 0.0012 
Valid 19 19 
Responses 
(t) Local Partner Sample(*) =Level ofSignificance 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Results obtained in this studyare consistent with findings of earlier studies, and in 
addition, bring to the fore some new discussions. First of all, there seems to be a 
dichotomy of decision areas, foreign parent dominated, local parent dominated, and IV 
autonomous decision areas. Although, there is no dear cut division in this regard, still, 
parent firm perceptions converge on "pricing", "product selection", "marketing", "wage 
and personnel", "executive selection", "quality control" decision areas, while there 
remains significant divergence in areas such as "long-term strategy", "costing", "capital 
expenditures", "product selection", "purchasing", 'fbudgeting", "financial accounting", 
and "training". 
Type of divergence emerged in this study, by and large, are type-I divergence, namely, 
both sides daim that they have more influence on the respective decision areas in 
international joint venture operations. There seems to be no type-II divergence of 
perceptions between parties involved, but existence of type-I divergence in perceptions 
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of parent f ? r m s s signals potential conflict areas. This c o n f ? r m s s findings of a previous 
studies'9 related to conflict and performance in such alliances. 
Although the pattern of control changes from case to case, the results suggest that a 
good co-operation between partners over key decision areas such as "pricing", 
"marketing", "wage and personnel policies", "quality control", "executive selection", 
and "training" is very important to the success of JVs. Moreover, previous research 
found that it is important for each partner to have a c1ear understanding of what he 
contributes to the arrangement and what he expects of his partner before entering a joint 
venture. This study has shown that a full awareness of the partners' need is equally 
importanl. Each partner needs to identify the areas where potential disagreements or 
conflicts may arise and keep this awareness through the whole life of the venture. 
The f ? n d i n g s s of the present study also suggest a number of implications for managers 
working in or with IJV s. At the strategic level, the f ? n d i n g s s lend support to equal control 
of strategic decisions between parents. Such an arrangement provides greater risk 
sharing and a broader pool of complementary resources, which may create a more 
conflict-free and hence more productive working relationship. On the other hand, at the 
operational level, IJV managers appear to exercise more freedom of operation, which is 
in line with the desire of the parent f ? r m s . . Thus, if parent f ? r m s s see JV management as 
representing the midpoint between markets and hierarchies,711 then such an organisation 
may be more c10sely situated to the market pole from the point of view of the investing 
parents. 
Findings presented in this study also suggest that differences between parent f ? r m s ' '
influence may be regarded as complementary rather than conflicting. In other words, it 
may be easier to manage a IV where one parent is, say, aggressive and the other is not, 
than to manage one with two aggressive parents which struggle to outdo each other. 
This argument lend support to Killing's empirical results. 
69 Demirbag, Mirza and Weir, op.dt.. 1997. 
71 Kogut. op.dt.• 1988. p.32 ? ı . 
